Abstract:

Aiming at the equilibrium problem between customized service level and cost-benefit control in apparel corpwrations, this paper discussed how cost-benefit analysis influences customized service decisions for raw material vendors and manufacturers in two-stages apparel supply chain and investigated in which case enterprises' customized service decision can both satisfy the demands of consumers and achieve the maximum benefit based on evolutionary game theory. The result show that one enterprise’s selection of customized service strategy is not only influenced by its behavior but also closely related to the decisions of its upstream corporations and downstream corporations. In a competitive market, the evolutionary direction and final stable equilibrium point can be obtained only if customized services of different corporations achieve the same level. In this case, enterprises’ additional benefits from customized service are not only greater than costs for customized service but also more than additional profit by taking a “free rider" during the process of providing service.

Key words: apparel corporation, customized service, evolutionary game, stable equilibrium